

SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Contributions

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Study on Burma
and Indo-China.

BURMA

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I. Transportation

A. Overland and inland water routes from China

1. Railroads

(a) What are capacity limitations of the Lashio-Mandalay route with reference to the special type of locomotive required?

The 176 mile single-track railway from Myohaung near Mandalay to Lashio traverses very difficult country. The line contains four reversing stations, and curves up to 17 degrees (radius 337 feet). The maximum gradient is 4 percent. Garrett-type locomotives are used. The maximum axle load is 11 short tons.

(b) What is the operating condition of all railroads?

Over two years, 1948 to 1950, of insurrection and disorder left the Burma Railways in a condition similar to that existing at the end of World War II. However, with the gradual restoration of governmental authority in 1950, operation was resumed on most of the lines.

Aside from a few private, light railways, there are no railways in Burma other than those of the Burma Railways.

The Burma Railways have about 2,000 route-miles of meter-gage track. About 1685 of the total route-miles are in operation. The remaining 315 miles are closed to traffic.

Table I: Sections not in operation; Burma Railways

Line	Section out		Miles not in operation
	From	To	
Bassein	Kyangan	Bassein	38
Bassein	Kyongan	Myogwin	48
Moulmein	Ye	Kalawthit	30
Pyinmana	Kyaupadaung	Pyinmana	67
Thazi via Myingyan	Paleik	Thazi	62
Iwataung Junction	Ye-U	Iwataung	70
			315

All of the line from Rangoon to Mandalay has been open to traffic since October 1951, when the gap of about 20 miles between Pyinmana and Shwemyo was put back in operation. The line from Rangoon to Prome is currently operative. The line from Pegu to Martaban is in operating condition except for the bridge which crosses the Sittang River at Mokpalin. A ferry is used for this crossing. The line from Moulmein to Ye is connected to the Pegu to Martaban line by another ferry across the Salween River. The line from Thazi to Shwenyaung is currently operative. From Myohaung to Myitkyina the line is in operation. The Ava Bridge over the Irrawaddy River, which provides the link between the two lines Rangoon-Mandalay and Mandalay-Myitkyina, was demolished during the war and is now being reconstructed. The break at this point constitutes the most serious bottleneck on the Burma Railways. Finally the line from Myohaung to Lashio is in operating condition.

Traffic is sometimes interrupted by guerrilla operations.

2. Inland waterways:

(a) What are the types and capacity of river craft available in the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy?

The operation of inland waterway craft on the rivers of Burma may be divided into two segments: first, the Inland Water Transport Board (IWTB) craft; and secondly, the privately-owned craft including all types of native craft as well as the limited number of privately-owned steamers. Statistics are available only on the first segment.

The native craft which ply the waterways are of many and varied designs. They range in size from small sampans to large river craft. These vessels are for the most part propelled by sail or by oar. There are no statistics available to indicate their number or tonnage but the combined native and privately-owned fleet is estimated as larger than the Inland Water Transport Board fleet.

A tabular inventory of craft owned by the Inland Water Transport Board as of June 1950 is shown in Table II.

Inventory of craft owned by Inland Water Transport Board as of June 22, 1950

<u>Type of vessel</u>	<u>Powered craft</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	
	<u>No. of vessels</u>	<u>Total gross tonnage</u>	
Paddle steamers	10	4,088	3 under construction
Stern-wheeler steamers	6	1,167	3 under construction
Creek steamers - twin screw	11	1,679	
Launches single decked	2	195	
Pilot launches	3	62	
Steam barges	1	965	
Steam tugs	3	308	
Miscellaneous vessels	2	231	
Motor vessels double decked	43	4,770	9 under construction
Motor Barges	30	3,670	
Motor tugs	48	3,385	
Motor launches	36	654	
Motor vessels of misc. type	8	1,543	
Total	205		15 under construction

Dumb Craft

Hulks	11	1,756	
Landing pontoons	3	220	Tonnage approximate
Flats	48	20,115	
Cargo boats	95	8,482	
Cargo barges	37	5,653	Former army units
Miscellaneous	110	3,623	Former army units
Total	342		

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Most of the steamers plying the Irrawaddy are operated by the I.W.B. They range from paddle steamers, 325 feet long with a $3\frac{1}{2}$ foot draft, to small launches. The total number of powered craft as of June 1950 was 194 but 15 additional were under construction. In addition, there are 342 dumb craft of all types. Native sailing craft are found in abundance, as are privately-owned launches.

The transport capacity provided by the 1950 inventory of all craft was approximately 1/3 of the available prewar water transport capacity.

(b) What are the present navigation conditions of and what obstructions to navigation exist on the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy?

Table III indicates the physical characteristics of the Irrawaddy from Mandalay to Myitkyna.

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bottom</u>	<u>Banks</u>	<u>Average Width (ft)</u>	<u>Safe Draft (ft)</u>	<u>Current (in knots) normal</u>
Mandalay	Singer	Natural Stream	Sandy	Steep	various	$3\frac{1}{2}$ -4	2
Singu	Tigyaing	" "	" "	"	3,000	$3\frac{1}{2}$ -4	2
Tigyaing	Bhamo	Natural	"	Chelving	4,200	$3\frac{1}{2}$ -4	2
Bhamo	Myitkyina	"	Gravel	"	1,500	$2\frac{1}{2}$ -3	2

No locks, dams, or aqueducts exist on the Irrawaddy. There is only one bridge over the main stream, the Ava bridge near Mandalay. The bridge is 3,760 feet long. Two spans in the center were damaged by bombing, but the navigable channel was not blocked. The horizontal clearance between the piers is about 320 feet, and the deck of the bridge is 40 feet above the highest known floods at Mandalay.

At Mandalay the river is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide with the navigable channel ranging in width from 900 to 1200 feet.

North of Mandalay vessels with drafts of $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet to 4 feet can navigate without difficulty except for a rock-bound gorge about 35 miles in length between Bhamo and Sinbo. This defile is navigable in the dry season by vessels not exceeding 150 feet in length and $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet in draft.

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Above Myitkyina, navigation may be accomplished locally by small dugouts and native craft.

The navigability of the tributaries of the Irrawaddy is as follows:

- (1) Nmai Hka - not navigable
- (2) Mali Hka - navigable only by small native craft over short interrupted sections.
- (3) Nam Tabet - navigable for about 25 miles by small native boats during the dry season and by launches during the rainy season.
- (4) Mogaung - navigable during the rainy season by launches drawing not more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet to Kamaing, a distance of about 99 miles, and by small native craft considerably further.
- (5) Mole Chaung - navigable during the high water season by native craft.
- (6) Taping - navigable for only a short distance by small native craft during the high water season.
- (7) Kaukkwe Chaung - navigable by small launches.
- (8) Shweli - navigable by small launches drawing about $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet during the dry season to Myitson, a distance of 80 miles.
- (9) Myitnge - navigable by small boats drawing 2 feet for a distance of about 45 miles.

3. Other Routes:

(a) What is the condition of the Stilwell (Ledo) Road between the Indian border and Mong Yu, where it junctions with the Burma Road?

The section of the Ledo Road between the Indian border and Warazup is a one-lane crushed-stone and gravel surfaced road in good-to-poor condition. In April 1952 about 50 miles of this section was impassable due to landslides. The section of road from Warazup to Myitkyina is also crushed-stone and gravel surfaced in fair condition. From Myitkyina to Bhamo the road is gravel surfaced in good condition. From Bhamo to Mong Yu the road is partially graveled in good-to-poor condition.

The Ledo Road is generally 10 to 15 feet in width and is a dry weather route.

(b) What is the condition and traffic capacity of the Burma Road between Wanting, at the China border 12 miles N.E. of Hong Yu, and Rangoon, its southern terminus? What types of transports are being used on this road? What supplies are being transported over this route?

The Burma Road is a one-lane bituminous-surfaced road in generally good condition. It is reportedly being maintained and is suitable for truck traffic providing maintenance is continued.

The supplies being transported on the Burma Road at present consist mainly of Burma's cotton, and the smuggling of lubricating oils and other motor accessories into China. Much of the present-day movement of cargo in Burma is dependent on animal transport.

(c) What is the condition and capacity of other roads between Yunnan and the Shamo-Myitkyina complex?

The Burma Road is believed to be the only all-weather motorable route between China and Burma. The trails from Lengchung to Myitkyina and Shamo are reportedly being improved, but it is not believed that they are as yet motorable. The trail from Yunksien to Kunlong following the proposed route of the Yunnan-Burma railway is not suitable for motor vehicles. There is no information on traffic over these trails.

(d) What is the condition and capacity of other routes from the Shan states into Yunnan? What supplies are being transported over them?

See "c" above.

B. Airfields

1. What is the present status of Mingaladon airport near Rangoon? When will its modernization be completed?

Mingaladon Airfield is the largest, most important airfield in Burma and the only airfield in Southeast Asia currently capable of sustained medium-bomber operations. The new 8,100 foot concrete runway, finished in February 1952, has a weight-bearing capacity of 300,000 pounds and is currently usable by jet-fighters. A new parking apron and taxi-track were scheduled for completion by June 1952. Further developments, which include a new terminal building and administration buildings, are projected for completion early in 1953. These buildings will be prefabricated structures, constructed outside the country.

2. What is the status of airfields currently in regular use by the Burma Air Force and Union of Burma Airways such as Mergui, Tavoy, Hmawbi, Anisakan (between Mandalay and Maymyo), Bhamo, Kengtung, Myitkyina, Moulmein, Bassein, Katha, Akyab, etc? What are the lengths and load bearing capacities of these airfields? What are the fuel storage facilities and what is the extent of fuel stockpiling? 1/

1/ Additional information pertaining to this question, which became available too late to be evaluated and incorporated, will be forwarded at a later date. (Attachment)

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description	Info. Attached
Akyab A/F	3	20-08N 92-53E	UBA and, occasionally, foreign airlines	6,900 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 80,000 lbs.; radio; drum fuel storage.	
Anisakan A/F	5	21-57N 96-21E	Local civil airlines	3,900 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47.	
Bassein A/F	5	16-48N 94-46E	UBA	3,000 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47; radio; limited lighting.	
Bhamo A/F	3	24-16N 97-15E	UBA	6,000 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 60,000 lbs.; taxiways; parking aprons; 32,000 gal. fuel tank.	
Gangaw A/F	5	22-09N 94-07E	UBA	3,900 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing C-47.	
Heho A/F	4	20-44N 96-47E	BAF and UBA	5,400 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; radio, limited drum fuel storage.	
Henzada A/F	5	17-36N 95-24E	UBA	3,600 ft. natural surface runway; weight-bearing, 28,000 lbs.	

S-E-C-R-E-T

* Class 1

Permanent runways 7,000 feet or more in length able to sustain medium bomber operations.

Class 2

Permanent runways 6,000 feet or more in length able to sustain limited medium bomber operations.

Class 3

Runways 5,000 feet or more in length potentially able to sustain medium-bomber operations.

Class 4

Runways 4,000 feet or more in length which can be used by light transports and conventional fighters.

Class 5

Runways 2,000 feet or more in length; airfield operational or potentially important.

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Hmawbi A/F	5	17-08N 96-01E	BAF	4,800 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, conventional fighter aircraft; taxiways; parking aprons; minor repair; 3 steel-frame hangars.
Kalemyo A/F	5	23-11N 94-04E	UBA	3,600 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Katha A/F	5	24-09N 96-19E	UBA (limited use)	3,600 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Kengtung II A/F	5	21-18N 99-39E	UBA	4,005 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing 26,000 lbs.
Kyaupyu A/F	5	19-25N 93-32E	UBA	4,480 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; parking aprons; World War II fuel storage tanks.
Lashio A/F	4	22-59N 97-45E	UBA and BAF	4,500 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 37,000 lbs.; limited radio, lighting, and POL.
Llanya A/F	5	20-56N 94-50E	UBA and Burma Oil Corp.	4,000 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; drum fuel storage.
Loi-kaw A/F	5	19-41N 97-13E	UBA and BAF	4,520 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; very limited drum fuel storage.
Magwe A/F	5	20-10N 94-57E	UBA	4,000 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Mandaley A/F	4	21-56N 96-06E	UBA and BAF	4,000 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; parking apron; radio; fuel tanks in Mandalay.
Meiktila A/F	3	20-53N 95-54E	UBA and BAF	6,000 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; drum fuel storage; 2 steel-frame hangars.
Mergui A/F	4	12-27N 98-38E	UBA, Siamese and Malayan Airlines	4,500 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-47; limited radio
Mingaladon A/F	1	16-54N 96-09E	BAF, UBA, and various international airlines	8,100 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 300,000 lbs.; taxiways; parking aprons; radio and lighting facilities; 100,000 gal. tank storage; bulk storage at Rangoon; major repair; 4 permanent hangars.

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Mong Njt A/F (Nomeik)	5	23-06N 96-38E	UBA	4,280 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Honywa A/F	5	22-13N 95-06E	UBA	4,900 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Mong Hsat A/F	5	20-32N 99-16E	CNAF (Chinese Nationalist Air Force)	6,000 ft. temporary runway; weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Myaungmya A/F	5	16-31N 94-56E	UBA	4,800 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Moulmein A/F	4	16-27N 97-40E	UBA and occa- sionally, BAF	5,100 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47; radio; drum fuel storage.
Myitkyina A/F South	3	25-23N 97-21E	UBA	6,080 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 60,000 lbs.; parking apron; radio; limited lighting; drum fuel storage; hangar.
Pakokku A/F	5	21-21N 95-07E	UBA	3,900 ft. natural surface runway, weight-bearing, un- known.
Pauk A/F	5	21-27N 94-28E	UBA	3,900 ft. natural surface runway, weight-bearing, 25,000 lbs.
Shwebo A/F	5	22-35N 95-14E	UBA	3,000 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Tavoy A/F	5	14-06N 98-13E	UBA	3,600 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing; C-47; parking apron; radio; limited lighting.
Tawsalun A/F	5	21-05N 94-09E	UBA	4,800 ft. temporary runway; weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Thaton A/F	5	16-56N 97-23E	UBA	3,900 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.
Toungoo A/F	5	19-01N 96-24E	UBA and BAF (limited use)	4,800 ft. temporary runway; weight-bearing, 30,000 lbs.; parking apron.

3. What are the fuel storage facilities and what is the extent of
fuel stockpiling at Burma airfields?

Burma's oilfields and refinery produce no aviation fuels. Thus Burma is entirely dependent upon foreign sources for avgas. The Burmah Oil Company furnishes the greater portion of petroleum products required by the Air Force. Standard Vacuum and Shell Oil Company also are suppliers, but the bulk of their products go to commercial users in Burma. Aviation fuel storage facilities at

airfields are found only in the Rangoon, Myitkyina, and Kyaukpyu areas. Fuel storage facilities are so limited that, if bases other than Mingaladon at Rangoon were used, the capability of the Burma Air Force would be much reduced. Aviation gas must be airlifted from Mingaladon (100,000 gal. tank storage) to other airfields and hand-pumped into the aircraft.

4. What is the current status of the numerous airstrips constructed by Americans, British and Japanese during World War II?

During World War II, a large number of airfields were constructed by both the Allies and Japanese. Those developed by the Japanese were either improvements and extensions of the few former RAF fields or, more frequently, hastily constructed rolled earth or laterite strips suitable for light Japanese-type aircraft. Japanese airfields usually took the form of a number of strategically located complexes, each consisting of at least one all-weather strip, surrounded by fair-weather satellites.

As the Allies took the offensive in Burma, they built a number of more substantial airfields, frequently on the site of a captured Japanese strip. From this group emerged most of the airfields currently operational or considered easily repairable.

The majority of the World War II airfields have since been abandoned. Some of them were rendered unserviceable by the Japanese on their withdrawal and have never been repaired; while others have fallen into a state of die-repair through lack of maintenance, encroachment of jungle, or by cultivation. More recently some have been damaged by insurgent activity. Of the more than 300 airfields which existed in Burma during World War II, only 36 are now listed as operational or repairable. Most of these are totally or partially lacking in such auxiliary facilities as lighting, aircraft maintenance, refueling, navigational aids, and communication services.

S-E-C-R-E-TC. Shipping

1. Describe in detail the condition of the channels and approaches, harbor conditions, navigational aids now being maintained, vessel accommodations, terminal installations, storage, clearance, logistic, and repair facilities
the following ports: (Akyab, Passein, Noulmein, Tavoy, Bergui and Victoria Point).

1. Studies on these ports have not been undertaken and detailed current information has not been available. Most of the information on these ports dates from 1948 or earlier. The ports listed suffered damage during the last World War. It is believed the preoccupation of the government with the rebel groups operating in the area generally has precluded substantial rehabilitation.

Akyab: The controlling depth at low water in the channels of approach and entrance is: Outer Bar 25 feet, Inner Bar 16 feet. A vessel drawing 29 feet could normally expect to enter and leave the outer harbor, but could be "neaped" on occasion. There is no limit to the length of vessel that could enter the outer harbor; 500 feet is considered the limiting length for the Inner Harbor.

Lights, beacons, and buoys mark danger areas and channels. Storm and weather signals, in accordance with the Indian general system, are displayed at Akyab. For more detail on navigational aids see "Sailing Directions for the Bay of Bengal," Hydrographic Office, Publication Number 140.

Pilotage is compulsory for merchant vessels and recommended for naval vessels. In 1948 two pilots were available. The pilots meet incoming vessels 3 miles south of Savage Island Lighthouse. The port cannot be entered in darkness.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

The port area and main wharf were heavily damaged during the war. In 1942, a Norwegian ship was bombed and sunk at the main wharf. It remained alongside the wharf until after the reoccupation. When it was removed, it was found that the waters around the jetty had silted until now there is but 6 feet of depth at the main wharf at low water. The Port Officer in 1948 estimated that it will be necessary to dredge a half million cubic yards of tough clay silt to again permit use of the main wharf and attendant facilities. However as of that date a suitable dredge was not available.

In the meantime, cargo is handled by lighters at the anchorage and unloaded at the jetty of the Arakan Flotilla Co. in Charugya Creek. The Port and Customs Authorities have set up shop alongside the Arakan Flotilla Co. installation, and it is expected that they will continue to function in site for the next two years.

The port has no heavy lift gear. A motor crane or two left by departing British Military forces can lift 3 tons; any item of greater weight must be landed by improvised methods.

Ten flat barge-lighters of 250 tons capacity each serve the needs of the port for lighterage. One sea-going tug and several smaller tugs provide power to move the lighters. Warehouse capacity is limited at present to 700 cubic tons, all in Nissen Huts. This is to be expanded as rehabilitation progresses.

A 500 foot tanker berth, from which a pipeline extends to shore, is situated about 2 miles west of the main wharf.

The only repair shops in Akyab are those of the Arakan Flotilla Company. These can accomplish minor hull and engine repairs, including welding and the making of castings of 100 lb. weight. There are no drydocks. A marine railway formerly in operation has not been rehabilitated since the war.

Except rice, Akyab cannot be depended upon to furnish any appreciable quantity of ordinary supplies. Rice can, of course, be had in abundance. The water supply of Akyab comes from a reservoir two miles distant. It should be boiled or chlorinated before drinking. It can be furnished in quantities up to 100 tons per day, the capacity of the port water boat.

Ordinarily there are no significant quantities of either coal or fuel oil available.

Bassein:

Use of port is limited by Port Authorities to single screw ships under 450 feet and twin screw ships under 470 feet owing to sharp bends in river.

Draft restrictions are caused by Panmawaddy flats below Wells Point where there is an almost stable 11'6" below M.L.S.

The harbor consists merely of that stretch of the river with the limits of the town.

Recommended anchorages are: (3 or 4 ships) ships over 400' - below town in Paduk Reach off Mata

- Ships 300' - 400' - above town off Steels Middle Mill (3 ships)

- Ships 250' - 300' - Midway between Custom House Jetty and Saw Hoko Mill

(2 or 3 ships)

- Ships between 350 and 450/470 feet can secure to head and stern buoys with lines ashore off Ellerman Arakan Rice Co. Mill and Malakar Rice Mill. It is the custom of the port to secure head in with starboard anchor down in mid-stream.

- Landing Craft Tank secure head to sea between two buoys close north of the Port Office.

- A swinging buoy for M.G.B.'s exists close north of the Port Office. Outer anchorages are off Dalhousie Point and Stoney Point.

All cargo is handled from barres using ships gear. There are no cranes (including floating cranes).

Four floating landing stages suitable for tugs or internal water transport craft are situated at Pyemu Road (Main I.W.T. craft station); at Mosque Road, at Victoria St. and the Custom House Jetty.

The availability of fuel and water, and fresh provisions is as follows:

Fuel Oil:

Marine Diesel (high speed diesel only) - stock varies from 400 drums down to about 10 drums.

Gasoline - same as for diesel

Engine and lubricating oils - available in small quantities

(Stocks are dispersed among various government authorities. Oil and gasoline are shipped in as required by the Burmah Oil Co. Its Agent is the Saw Hoko and Co.)

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S-E-C-U-R-E-T

Quantity unknown. Supplier is the British Air Ministry.

Coal and patent fuel:

100 to 150 tons of Indian coal, in custody of Port Authority, stored ashore on opposite bank to Ellerman Arakan Rice Mill. Coaling is done by baskets on barges at a rate of 20 tons per day.

Water:

Water for drinking and water for tube boilers can be drawn from a well on the Port Office compound (all drinking water should be boiled before using). Water for cylindrical boilers can be taken from the river on the last of the ebb tide. Water can be supplied vessels at anchor by the St. Louise at the rate of 40 tons per day or in 40 gallon drums.

Fresh Provisions:

Very limited quantities at all seasons. No cold storage facilities.

There are no graving or floating docks.

Moulmein:

The navigable entrance to the Salween River also known as Moulmein River is much encumbered by extensive sand banks and reefs. The river as far as Moulmein is usually navigable by vessels with drafts from 13 feet at high water neaps, to 23 feet at high water springs.

Lights and buoys mark most of the numerous rocks, reefs and shoals in the channel and harbor. There is a signal station with International Code flags displayed from the flagstaff on Amherst Point. In 1942 one pilot, a native, brought in all the ships. For more detail on navigational aids see R. I. Publication number 160.

There are available three large and one small mooring buoys at Moulmein waterfront in addition to the one 14 miles below the city.

Marfage at Moulmein consists of two pontoon jetties adequate only for lighters. No mechanical aids such as cranes are available. All cargo must be "man-handled" from lighter to jetty to shore.

Cargo is handled by unloading onto the docks of flat 250-ton steel lighters. Fifteen such lighters are available, and 5 small tugs for handling these lighters.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Before the war, limited supplies of coal were maintained. Ships could be bunkered at the rate of about 100 tons per 12 hours. There are very limited oil storage facilities at Moulmein; ships are fueled from drums delivered by lighters. Water can be supplied either by the port water-barge (55 ton capacity) or by pipe line alongside the Mission Street and Kaladan Jetties with a maximum of 50 tons per 24 hours.

There is no more recent information on coal, oil, or water supplies at this port; nor is there any current information on repair facilities.

Tavoy:

The limiting depth of the channel to Tavoy is usually taken as 10 feet. Even boats of that draft must proceed with caution and take advantage of the top half of the tide.

Tavoy cannot be said to have a harbor in the generally accepted meaning of the term. Vessels carrying cargo to or from Tavoy anchor at the mouth of the Tavoy River off Grindstone Island. There is ample safe anchorage available for vessels drawing up to 20 feet, and a limited number of berths available for vessels drawing up to 30 feet.

Sailing lighters, with an average capacity of 75 tons are used for moving cargo the remaining 35 miles to Tavoy. These lighters take advantage of wind and tide in moving in either direction. While slow, they rarely require a tow. In 1948 the only tug normally available was a 200-foot passenger launch owned by the British-Indian Steam Navigation Company.

The following information on navigational aids is from a study dated 1945. There is a lighthouse on Mioya Kyun and a lighted beacon in the shoal water immediately west of the tip of Pyin-Gyi Island. There is also a lighted beacon (sun-valve type) with a flashing light, marking the reef at a dangerous bend up-river approaching Tavoy. This beacon is essential for navigation particularly at night. Leading marks, board, and basket beacons, are also sited in appropriate positions marking the crossing over the bars. For more detail on navigational aids see H.O. No. 160.

Cargo handling facilities at Tavoy, as of 1 October 1948, consisted of 3 sailing-lighters of the type mentioned, and the one steam launch also mentioned. It is reported that there are no cargo handling aids available at the waterfront.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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There is no current information on coal, oil and water facilities.

No dry or floating docks are available.

Mergui:

The limiting depth of the channel from the anchorage in to Mergui waterfront is usually taken as 12 feet. It has been noted that the channel is silting in recent years. This is generally ascribed to the existence of a Japanese wreck sunk at the junction of the channel with another stream just off the southeast tip of Mergui town.

Vessels drawing more than 12 feet anchor five miles north of Mergui town. Ample anchorage in a protected deep-water channel extending northward exists for almost any number of ships. On occasion during the war, Japanese warships anchored off Palaw.

Cargo handling facilities at Mergui consist of 3 small launch-tugs and 8 76-ton lighters. There are no harbor facilities. A pontoon jetty onto which lighters could be unloaded, filled with water and sank in July 1948. It has not been raised, nor has anything been provided to take its place. Unloading of lighters is accomplished by hand over the sea-wall at high tide. It is found very difficult to so handle any loads of greater than 1-ton weight.

As of 1941 there were beacons, buoys, and a lighthouse. There is, however, no current data on navigational aids.

There is no current data on supplies, but in 1945 small quantities of both coal and fuel oil were available and a limited supply of water from a small surface well was available.

Minor repairs could be undertaken in 1945; there is no later information.

Victoria Point:

The most recent information on this port is dated 1945.

There are three intricate entrance channels, which are not buoyed, and great caution is necessary when navigating them. Without leading lights, it is unlikely that they could be navigated at night, except by small craft. The least depths at low water springs are 11 feet in the northern, 19 feet in the western, and 2½ feet in the southern channel.

There is good sheltered anchorage for ships of all sizes, about ½ mile south of Victoria Point. Anchorage is also possible in the entrance-channels. In the harbor there is anchorage off the jetty in 7 to 8 fathoms, but the eddies are bad here and it is preferable, in small craft, to anchor farther south, in 3 to 4 fathoms.

The largest vessel using the port in normal times was the S. S. Matang, 253 feet long, 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ foot draft. This ship, and other coasting steamers, did not normally enter the inner harbor but anchored in the channel about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile south of the Point. There is accommodation for several such steamers in the channel.

The jetty is a stone pier about 500 feet long and 18 feet wide, widening to about 50 feet at the outer end. Small craft of 8 feet draft can come alongside the sides of the pier at high water. Ships discharge into lighters because of the draft restrictions. There are no cranes.

There is a small customs godown near the jetty. Native shops on the waterfront could be cleared and used as warehouses.

Normally there is no stock of coal. There is no bulk storage of oil, but small stocks of high-speed diesel oil and of kerosene and petrol, are normally stored in drums and tins. The only method of fueling is from drums taken out by lighters.

There are several water wells but supplies are scarce in the dry weather.

No docks and repair facilities are available.

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2. What fuel oil stocks and fuel oil storage facilities are currently available in those parts?

There is no current information on fuel oil stocks in those ports other than that indicated in the answer to the preceding question (IC1); however, the fact that Burma imports a very large percentage of her petroleum needs suggests limited stocks.

There are very limited storage facilities at Bassein, Akyab, and Moulmein. Nothing is known of the facilities at Tavoy, Mergui and Victoria Point (other than described in question I.C.1.)

D. General

What is the nature and extent of Chinese Communist material assistance to dissident groups in Burma? To what extent is this limited by inadequate transport facilities?

Information regarding the nature and extent of Chinese Communist assistance to dissident groups in Burma is extremely limited. All available information indicates that this aid consists almost entirely of advisory and training assistance to the Burma Communist Party (BCP). This aid is believed to have been, for the most part, confined to giving political and military training in Yunnan to small numbers of the BCP who have entered China and subsequently may have returned to Burma. Aside from this, there is no firm evidence of material aid to Burmese dissidents. It is possible that a few advisers are with the BCP forces. There are also a few reports of specific material aid to the BCP but they are fragmentary and of doubtful reliability. Inadequate transport facilities are not the limiting factor in the extent of aid being given to the BCP at present.

II. Trade

A. What kind and quantity of supplies, both open and clandestine, have been shipped to Burma from Soviet Bloc nations? Which routes are used primarily?

There are practically no open or clandestine shipments to Burma from any Soviet Bloc nation except China. Shipments from China are made by land across the Burma-China border as well as by sea. Although available trade statistics do not give a breakdown by country and by commodity, imports are believed to include textiles, raw silk, sugar, and such miscellaneous items as livestock, eggs and vegetables. Opium may also be smuggled into Burma.

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 as transit trade. There is no information on what routes are used for such shipments.

B. What kind and quantity of supplies of major importance have been shipped to Burma by non-Bloc nations? Which routes are used primarily?

Supplies of major importance from non-Bloc nations, arriving chiefly by sea, include cotton yarn and fabrics, gunny bags, machinery and transportation equipment, base metals and manufactures, pharmaceutical products, petroleum, and a variety of food products. Although available Burmese customs statistics do not regularly give a breakdown by trade by country, it is believed that the sources of most of the following imports, constituting Burma's total trade in these commodities, are from non-Bloc nations. All of Burma's petroleum imports came from Iran.

Textiles:

Total imports, 1951

Bags and sacks for packing (mostly gunny bags)	20,693,000 pieces
Cotton yarn and thread	9,528,000 lbs.
Cotton fabrics 1/	85,463,000 yards

Food Products:

Sugar and preparations	133 long tons
Tea	2,591,600 lbs.
Fish and fish products	12,980,000 lbs.
Groundnut oil	13,615 long tons 2/

Petroleum Products:

Aviation gasoline	1,891,000 imp. gals
Motor gasoline	17,360,000 " "
Superior kerosene	4,073,000 " "
Inferior kerosene H. S. diesel	11,295,000 " "
	34,619,000 " "

Groundnut oil is a major but not the only edible oil import. Trade reports indicate that total imports of edible oils amounted to 10,600 tons in the period October 1951 to March 1952 as compared to 18,200 tons in FY 1951 (October 1950 to September 1951). The five year trade agreement with India signed in 1952 provides for the release of export to Burma of 8,000 tons of groundnut (peanut) oil yearly.

1/ First nine months of 1951.

2/ Malayan trade statistics show the export of 3,493 tons of groundnut oil to Burma in 1951 and 13,738 tons of coconut oil.

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C. Which Burmese exports are of major importance to non-Bloc nations?

What is the present situation at the Bawdwin mines? of the mines at Tenasserim? of the Mawchi mines? To what extent are such food deficit areas as India, Ceylon, Japan, Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Borneo and Indonesia dependent on rice from Burma?

Burmese exports of major importance to non-Bloc nations are rice, teak and other hard woods, metals (nickel, lead, antimony, zinc, manganese, tin and wolfram), pulses (a grain) and other food products. Normally Burma also exports petroleum; at the present time, however, the industry has not yet recovered from wartime dislocations, and Burma is not self-sufficient in petroleum products.

The Bawdwin mine is still not in operation although the company hopes to begin in September 1952. Shipments so far have been entirely from stockpiles. Major impediments have been lack of rail transport and skilled labor. Operation will be on a joint basis by the Burma Government and the former owners who have formed a new company, the Burma Corporation (1951) Ltd., incorporated on January 15, 1952. The Bawdwin mining lease has been renewed in favor of the new company for a 25-year period, commencing January 1, 1950.

As of mid-1952 there has been little real improvement in security conditions in the Tenasserim area around the tin and tungsten mines. The Tenasserim area was formerly exploited by eight or ten small companies and numerous independent operators. These activities are, in general, suspended at the present due to (1) continued disturbed security conditions and (2) uncertainty as to the government's attitude. M.S. Han & Co. is excavating tin and tungsten ores from their properties near the rail line just north of Thaton, about 35 miles north of Moulmein; however, their other holdings located more than a mile from the rail line cannot be worked due to the presence of insurgents. In Mergui and Tavoy, several established British and Chinese-owned concerns formerly operated alluvial and eluvial tin and wolfram deposits. These companies have been unable to import the comparatively small amounts of spare parts and equipment needed to resume operations, reportedly due to difficulty in obtaining import licenses.

Mawchi mine is still cut off from the outside world by insurgent activity. Four Europeans and 150 other employees staff the installation on a care-and-maintenance basis. It is believed that rehabilitation of the mine and mill will take at least a year after the restoration of law and order.

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During 1951 the major recipients of Burma's 1.3 million tons of rice exports were: Ceylon (383,000 tons), India (309,000), Indonesia (202,000), Japan (175,000), Malaya (63,000) and the Ryukyus (24,000). In 1952 Burma and India negotiated a five-year trade agreement under which Burma agreed to supply India 350,000 tons of rice annually.

D. What factors have entered into the reported improvement in the Karen forces of eastern Burma? Has the Karen supply position improved materially? What is the extent of arms smuggling in the Karens from Thailand and from other sources?

There is no specific information available on the first two questions.

The extent of arms smuggling to the Karen from Thailand and other sources is difficult to assess since many of the shipments seem to be in transit. Shipments of arms, ammunition, tires, lubricating oils and gasoline are moving into Burma from Thailand. More arms and ammunition have been received from China. Shipments of tires, lubricating oils and engine parts have been sent to China while arms and ammunition are smuggled into Assam from Burma. Thus, shipments into Burma, at least in part, have been offset by shipments out of Burma and the extent to which the requirements of the Karens have been satisfied is unknown. It is believed, however, that they have received sufficient small arms, mortars and ammunition to enable them to conduct guerrilla actions.

III. Manpower

A. What is the source of manpower for the recent expansion of the Burmese Army? How many Karen former service personnel have been restored to duty with the government forces? How many remain interned? Which Burmese Army units have been absorbed "de-interned"? What is the type of screening conducted of personnel recruited and what are the requirements for enlistments?

Firm information regarding the principal sources of the additional personnel enlisted in the Burmese Armed Forces is not available. However, it has been reported by an Army Attaché that he does not believe that the various para-military forces (Peace Guerrillas, Sitwundans, or other "home guards") have been exploited to any significant extent. A country-wide recruitment program has been undertaken by Army unit commanders in each district in which Army units are located.

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A recent report (mid-September) stated that 523 Karen officers and men had been reinstated during the last year and were now serving with the Army. The War Office refusal, however, to release these alleged "official figures" casts some doubt upon their accuracy. Earlier information indicated that only a nominal number had been restored to duty but that a larger number of the Karen internees had been released. No firm figures are available regarding the number of Karens still interned either in the category of "former military personnel" or of civilian internees.

Screening of recruits appears to be done in the most haphazard manner. The Army unit commander responsible for recruitment undertakes a general screening for reliability upon the basis of his, or other local officials', personnel knowledge of the recruits' political attitude toward the Government and the Commander's general assessment of the prospective recruits' probable loyalty to the Army. No further screening is known to be attempted. Specific requirements for enlistment are unknown.

B. What are the number, function, status, and influence of the Chinese Communist "advisors" or "volunteers" in Burma?

A few reports of unknown reliability indicate there are some Chinese Communist "advisors" with the BCP but their functions and status are not known, nor are any firm figures available which would indicate the scope or level of their activities. Possibly they are liaison personnel to observe, as well as advise, the BCP operations and organization. The presence of any Chinese Communist personnel with the BCP has been denied by Burmese officials who regard such reports as propaganda by the BCP to exaggerate their importance and influence.

The principal "volunteer" force designed to serve Chinese Communist ends in Burma is Naw Seng's battalion. This force is composed mainly of Sino-Kachins and has an estimated strength of 1,000-1,500. The major part of this group is believed to be still in Yunnan, although a few reports have indicated that Naw Seng, accompanied by a few troops, may have infiltrated into Burma from time to time.

C. To what extent are Burmese Communist party personnel being equipped and trained in Communist China?

See the answer to question I. D. above, regarding this form of assistance to the BCP.

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**D. What is the BCP manpower potential? What are the limiting factors?
What are the BCP recruitment replacement techniques?**

The military potential of the Burmese Communist insurgents is probably restricted as much by shortages of weapons and equipment as by manpower limitations.

In the past, an adequate number of replacements could be secured from areas of Communist control or influence, through propaganda and political indoctrination at the village level. Some recruits are probably obtained during raids on Government-held villages, among disaffected elements and prisoners released from jail.

Recent Government military successes, however, have reduced the areas held by Communist insurgents and forced them to retreat toward lightly populated and less productive areas. The Communists may, therefore, face increasing manpower problems; the area of possible recruitment is being reduced and Communist affiliation is becoming less palatable for opportunitistic elements.

It is not possible to give accurate figures for present or potential manpower, and no detailed information is available concerning replacement techniques. There are no indications, however, that the Communists have resorted to impressment or conscription.

IV. Food

A. What is the current food production in Burma? To what extent have insurgents affected Burma's capacity to meet its own food requirements? To what extent are the insurgents self-sufficient in food production?

The production of almost all food crops in Burma is currently lower than prewar. Overall agricultural production, including the principal crop, rice, is estimated to have reached a level of 75 percent of prewar in the 1951-52 crop year. Rice output is estimated at 3.7 million tons of milled rice, compared to 4.9 million in the prewar period 1935-36 to 1940-41. Burma is still a rice exporting country, however, and there is no domestic shortage of rice, the major item of diet. Food shortages are felt in edible oils, and refined sugar.

It is not clear how much of the decline in production is due to insurgent activity. Acreage of oil bearing crops, chiefly peanuts and sesame, has decreased. Farmers have reduced sugar cane acreage with the result that cane production is still under prewar. The only sugar factory in Burma was held by insurgents from early 1949 to March 1950 and was not in operation during that period. Difficulties in distributing food supplies are encountered because of transport problems.

Information concerning the food supply of insurgent groups is too inadequate to permit an assessment of this problem.

B. What are the principal areas of crop production and in what areas has insurgent activity decreased production?

Before the war 77 percent of the rice acreage was in Lower Burma (over 50 percent in the Pegu and Irrawaddy Divisions) and 23 percent in Upper Burma. Estimates of the 1951-52 group crop indicate that as compared with prewar there has been a 25 percent decrease in acreage in Lower Burma (2.5 million acres) and about 20 percent decrease in Upper Burma (.6 million acres). In Upper Burma the principal districts in which acreage has decreased are Akyab, Pegu, Bassein, Myanngmya, Maubin, Pyapon and Toungoo; in Lower Burma, Thayetmyo, Magwe, Meiktila, Shwebo, and Katha. Much of the rice acreage in these districts was abandoned during the war and it would appear that insurgent activity has prevented its reclamation in the postwar years.

C. To what extent is Burma dependent on food imports from Bloc nations?

From non-Bloc nations?

Burma is not dependent on Bloc nations for food imports. No information is available on the volume of food imports by countries but it is believed they are primarily from non-Soviet Bloc nations. India is believed to be a major source of edible oil imports. As previously stated, the five-year trade agreement with India provides for the export to Burma of 8,000 tons of peanut oil annually.

V. Stockpiles

A. How many weapons (rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars, artillery, armored cars, other vehicles) are there now "in the hands" of the Government?

What stocks are retained by the War Office? What is the present status of Burmese ammunition stocks?

Virtually all weapons held by the Government are believed to be in the hands of the troops at present. No weapons, other than a limited number held in Ordnance Shops for repair and possibly a small percentage held for replacement, are believed to be retained in War Office stocks. The following is an estimate of the number of each type of weapon held by the Government forces. No adequate information on ammunition supply for each type is available.

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<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Rifles	40,000
Pistols	1,000
MG's (Bren)	1,500
St (Sten)	3,500
Mortars (2 in.)	242
(3 in.)	65
Artillery: 6 pounder	20
25 pounder	24
Armor: Bren carriers	62
Armed cars	35
L Tks	9
M Tks	2

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B. What information is there regarding the kind, quantity, and location of stockpiles within South China which might be employed in Burma?

Information concerning the location of stockpiles in South China, and the quantities and types of material stored in this area, is as a general rule, limited to low-grade reports of doubtful reliability. Furthermore, the information contained in such reports is extremely fragmentary. Even if the reports were taken at face value, they would provide insufficient information upon which to make an estimate either of the quantities of material stored in any given location or of the total inventories of material in the entire South China area or any other area of China.

The general tenor of the reports, however, indicates that military supplies are stored in warehouses and storage facilities in virtually all of the principal towns and cities along the south China rail net (Changsha, Hengyang, Kukong, Canton, Kweilin, Liuchou, Nanning, etc.) as well as in numerous river towns such as Liuchou and Huiyang. A number of reports indicate that military supplies are stored in the Whampoa area, the Wanshan Islands, and Hainan Island. Most of the reports concerning Hainan are probably greatly exaggerated. In the China-Indochina border area, stockpiles and/or warehouses (including caves, temples, and private residences which have been converted into warehouses) have been reported in the Ningming, Lungchou, Fangchen, Yamchow, Cinghsia, and Kunming areas.

Apart from generalized statements that "military supplies" are stored in a particular area, the reports indicate that a wide variety of military items are stockpiled, including rifles, mortars, artillery pieces (including AA), ammunition, food, clothing, medical supplies, signal equipment, engineering equipment, POL, trucks, spare parts, explosives, and "strategic materials". There is insufficient information upon which to assess the quantity of a given category in any single location or the total quantity for the area as a whole.

VI. Military Production Capacity

A. What facilities exist in Burma for the manufacture of military supplies in both government-held and insurgent territories? What are the capabilities of these facilities? Their current production?

Burma is almost entirely dependent upon outside sources for supplies of armaments, ammunition and other military equipment. The primary source of Burma's

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supplies is the UK, although transactions have been noted with other countries including the United States.

Burma has one government arms factory in Rangoon which produces a small amount of ammunition, caliber 303 and 9 mm., and Italian-type Bren guns known as Type T2-45. Some of the equipment for this plant was purchased in Italy. The plant has Italian technicians. Production in this plant has been a closely guarded secret, but it is believed to be very small and insufficient to meet current requirements. It has been stated that 1,000 Bren-type guns were delivered to the Burmese Armed Forces and that they were presumed to have been manufactured in the Arms Plants. The potential capacity is estimated at 2,500,000 rounds of 303 ammunition, 2,250,000 rounds of 9 mm. ammunition and a very few guns. The management is said to be responsible for the ineffectiveness and poor showing of the plant.

Small arms ammunition for the Karen forces is being produced in Toungoo, Papun Moribai, and Pasawng. British and Japanese technicians are reported at Pasawng where guns reportedly are repaired.

No other munition plants are known to be in Burma.

No motor vehicle plants are found in Burma. Automobile repair shops and tire repair plants have maintained the trucks and cars but these facilities are badly in need of equipment. Three body building shops are operated in Rangoon. Their production is greatly limited due to shortages and high prices in iron plate, nuts and bolts, and enamel paint. The shops also lack sufficient capital to be effective.

B. What is the present condition of Burma's oil fields and refining facilities and what would be required to place them in efficient operation? What would be the maximum production of crude and refined products after rehabilitation?

Since 1946 crude production to a large extent has been limited to certain areas of the Chauk fields where the presence of Burmese troops has made it reasonably safe to work. Present crude oil output is estimated 2,000 barrels daily. The Yenangyaung and Yenangyat fields have remained inaccessible since mid-1948 when political dissidents launched armed rebellion against the government.

Latest information available (April 1952) indicates that the Burmah Oil Company has successfully moved its Syrian refinery, on the coast near Rangoon, to the Chauk oil fields. The equipment moved included a two-stage Winkler-Koch crude oil distillation unit of 2,500 barrels daily capacity, with the required auxiliary tankage, piping, and pumping facilities. This new unit will bring the

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throughput refining capacity to 4,500 barrels daily. It has been suggested that there will be no increase in refining operations through 1955.

There is no information on what would be required to place the facilities in efficient operation. Prior to World War II/^{daily}output of crude oil, and refined products were respectively 21,000 and 19,000 barrels, or approximately 10 times present production levels. S.J. Bradshaw, Director of the Burma Geological Department,^{has}indicated that known reserves are sufficient to produce 10,000 barrels daily for at least a 15-year period and still have another 20,000,000 barrels recoverable at a gradually declining rate.

VII. Political

A. To what extent are the Burmese Communists linked with or receiving voluntary aid from the Karen, Shan, Kachin, and other minority groups?

Cooperation between the Communists and Karens appears to be largely limited to ad hoc military arrangements in scattered areas in the Irrawaddy delta. Burmese Communists may maintain contact with dissident Kachins under Kaw Seng. Little or no information is available on contacts with other dissident minorities.

B. How and with what success do the Chinese Communists attempt to influence non-dissident groups in and out of the government of Burma?

The Chinese Communists have attempted to influence non-dissident Burmese groups in and out of the government by appealing to the Marxist inclinations, longstanding anti-Western sentiments, and desire for neutrality in the East-West struggle of most Burmese politicians. This policy has met with only a slight degree of success, for while the Burmese Government holds to its neutral foreign policy, it still maintains limited military and economic ties with the West. While Pei-p'ing's political influence on the overseas Chinese in Burma reached its heights during 1949-50 following the collapse of the Nationalists in China, it has markedly declined during the past two years.

C. To what extent, if any, has the Karen insurgent movement broken up into divergent groups? How extensive is the influence of pro-Communist Karens such as Mahn Ba Zen and Brigadier Kyaw Sein? What is the extent of Karen sentiment for negotiating a settlement of the revolt?

The varying courses of action adopted by the Karens - negotiation and limited cooperation with the Communists, negotiation and surrender to government forces, or continued single-handed resistance to the government - would appear to indicate

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that the Karen movement has broken into divergent groups. According to what little information is available, it appears that the influence of pro-Communist Karen leaders is extensive among the Karens in the Delta area of Lower Burma. More direct evidence of any splits among Karens is lacking as are indications of the attitude of the rank and file toward the various courses open to the Karen insurgents.

D. What is the pattern of the decision-making process in the GOM, i.e., what individuals are consulted on important policy questions both within the government and within the AFITL?

There is a general impression, unsupported by evidence, that almost all decisions of any consequence are made on the Cabinet level with little delegation of authority to lower echelons. Ba Swe, Kyaw Hsein and U Nu appear to be the key individuals in the government who are consulted on major decisions, although at times the prime minister may act independently.

E. What is the active membership of the major political parties in Burma and their supporting mass organization (e.g. ABPO, TUCB, etc.)?

There is little reliable data on membership of political parties and supporting mass organizations.

F. What is the basic structure of the Buddhist hierarchy in Burma? To what extent do the clergy participate in politics? Who are the key clerical Buddhist leaders?

What little information is available indicates that Burma's Buddhist hierarchy is loosely-structured with no strong central control exercised over the order. It would appear that the clergy as such does not participate in Burmese politics to any significant extent. Premier U Nu and other prominent politically active Buddhist laymen are sponsoring a nation-wide Buddhist revival movement. No information is available on the identity of the key clerical Buddhist leaders.

G. How extensive are the Muslim disorders in the Arakan? To what extent is the Mujahid movement politically motivated? How large a force does Bo Kessim command?

The little information available on the Muslim disorders in the Arakan indicates that they are essentially a result of bandit activity conducted by opportunists who may sometimes attempt to appeal to the Muslim sentiments of the minority group in the Arakan area. There is no indication of the size of the forces involved (under the leadership of Bo Kessim) other than that they are probably small. Very little information is available concerning the Mujahid as a political movement.

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H. What are Ba Swe's relations with BCP and other dissident groups? Would the army continue to obey him if he openly adopted a pro-Communist position? What are his relations to Ne Win?

The occasional reports of contacts between Ba Swe and the BCP are of doubtful reliability. As Minister of Defense he has conducted an aggressive campaign against Communist guerrillas. His relations with Ne Win are reportedly good. In the unlikely event that Ba Swe and/or the Burma Army leaders should adopt an outright pro-Communist policy, those Army units consisting of Kachins and Chins would possibly cease to obey them.

I. What is the present status and strength of the BTF (Sittannav) ? What is the present status and strength of the peoples' peace guerrillas? What other armed groups or home guard units exist? What information is available on state forces, regular or irregular? What is the present attitude (loyalty and morale) of minority racial groups in the armed forces toward the Government? What is the present status of Gurkha personnel and units?

No information available.

J. What is the present status and effectiveness of Ne Win's "loyal officers and men"? What are his present relations with the Socialist Party? Who are his principal supporters and opponents in the Government?

There is virtually no direct information on the political activities of Ne Win over the past six months, and it is impossible to reply to this question.